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had several short-lived governments followed by the emergence of two oppressive dictatorships, those of Fulgencio Batista (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) and Fidel Castro (1959-present).
Over two decades after the United States exited Cuba for the final time, at the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. engaged in the most ambitious effort in its history to democratize wartorn countries with the occupation and reconstruction of West Germany and Japan. In both cases, the outcome was drastically different than that in Cuba. In both West Germany and Japan, military occupiers were able to successfully transform war-torn countries into liberal democracies that have survived to this day.
In May of 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allied forces. Leaders from the Allied countries had gathered in a series of conferences both before and after Germany's surrender to determine a common occupation policy. The main tenets of this policy were that Germany would be partitioned and each Allied power would control a zone, Nazism would be abolished, the country would be democratized, war criminals would be punished and reparations would be paid. The U.S. would carry out the reconstruction of its Western zone from 1945-1955.
The physical infrastructure, economy and morale of the German people had been devastated by the war. During the occupation of its zone, the U.S. disbanded the government and assumed control of the provision of public goods at the municipal and local level and managed administrative and budgetary functions. Despite the destruction of the country, economic recovery occurred relatively quickly. Although there were many economic ups and downs, annual economic indicators showed double-digit growth in the GDP of West Germany from 1947 to 1952. 5 Historians and policymakers continue to debate the factors that contributed to this recovery. Some attribute it to the aid delivered under the Marshall Plan, and others emphasize the currency and fiscal reforms of Ludwig Erhard as the catalyst of the recovery.
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concludes on this issue, few would disagree that the reconstruction effort was able to transform West Germany into a liberal democracy. This is not to indicate that the reconstruction process did not suffer any setbacks. The process was far from smooth, both within each zone and also across zones. Progress occurred at different rates and on different margins, but overall, if the standard against which the reconstruction of Germany is judged is the sustainability of the reconstructed orders, it must be deemed a success.
Although the specifics of the U.S. experience in Japan were clearly different, the outcome was very similar to that of West Germany. Following the use of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese officials surrendered unconditionally in September 1945. Like Germany, Japan's infrastructure, economy and morale had been severely damaged during the war. The terms of Japan's surrender had been determined by the U.S., the United Kingdom and China at the Potsdam Conference in July of 1945. In addition to unconditional surrender, the Potsdam Declaration required the purging of certain government officials, required the Allied occupation to democratize Japan, military disarmament and the establishment of freedom of thought, speech and religion.
Despite the fact that several countries agreed to the terms of surrender at Potsdam, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, directed the occupation unilaterally. He decided basic policies and utilized his position of power to implement them. The United States' unilateral power in Japan during this period is evidenced by the fact that no other Allied nation challenged U.S. authority during the reconstruction process.
1-7 populace. 8 A new constitution was drafted over a relatively short period of time and went into effect in May 1947. According to the guidelines of the Constitution, the emperor lost all military and political power and became a figurehead of the State. As with Germany, there were many bumps in the road, but most would agree that occupiers had established a sustainable liberal democracy by the time they exited Japan in April 1952.
The successful cases of Japan and West Germany have lasting importance. Not only do they exist in contrast to the failures in Cuba, these cases laid the groundwork for the perception of the United States' ability to successfully export liberal democracy at gunpoint. Indeed, the U.S. undertook several subsequent efforts to export liberal democracy during the Cold War, As of this writing, the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to unfold. It is too early to determine with certainty whether these reconstructions will achieve their desired end of creating sustaining liberal democracies. However, while the initial military operations in both countries were successful, the aftermath has been a different story. In both cases, the existing governing regimes were easily toppled, but subsequent reconstruction efforts have been met with strong resistance. Dispersed pockets of insurgents located throughout each country characterize the nature of the resistance -there is no longer a central enemy that can be confronted head-on.
Moreover, costs -both monetary and human -have substantially exceeded initial predictions.
Further, public opinion seems to be turning against prolonging the occupations and support is increasing for withdrawal sooner rather than later. 11 It may take several years, or even decades, before the outcomes of these efforts can be judged as successes or failures, but at least in the short-term, the possibility of success is not looking good compared to what happened after WWII in West Germany and Japan.
These brief narratives are not meant to do justice to the complexities of the cases discussed. Instead, the purpose is to highlight the long and varied history of U. The effort to win the "war on terror" has been a driving force behind the emphasis on spreading democracy via military occupation. In this context, the underlying logic is that the spread of democracy will greatly reduce, if not eradicate, the terrorist threat. It is widely recognized that the major threat to the U.S. is no longer a few powerful countries, as during the Cold War, but instead the threat posed by countries lacking a strong and effective central government. 12 Reconstruction efforts attempt to remedy this situation by establishing the foundations of sustaining liberal democratic institutions.
Moreover, there is also an increasing call in the academic literature for the U.S. to embrace its role as an empire. A key advocate of this position, Niall Ferguson, contends that America should utilize its relative position of power in the world to impose liberal political and economic institutions in weak and failed states. 13 These efforts, Ferguson contends, should not be 1-10 constrained by the "light footprint" approach to occupation, but instead, should establish colonial administrations, when necessary, to achieve the desired ends. I will return to this "brute force" theory later, but for now, the key point is that there is good reason to believe that U.S. involvement in reconstruction efforts will continue beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Viewed from the perspective of political economy, the reconstruction process can be seen as an issue of incentive compatibility. Occupiers must establish the "rules of the game" but also ensure that incentives are in place for the populace of the reconstructed country to follow those rules once occupiers exit. As such, economic analysis can assist in understanding if the formal and informal rules of the reconstruction "game" provide the necessary incentive for members of the populace to engage in activities that support a self-sustaining liberal order. In other words, economics provides the means of adjudicating between the factors and mechanisms that generate the incentive to engage in sustained cooperation or in continued conflict.
A discussion and analysis of reconstruction must draw on knowledge from a wide range of disciplines. I am an economist and thus perhaps lack the insights a historian, political scientist or a regional expert might provide given their purviews, but I have reviewed the relevant literature and reached the conclusion that the tools of economics can assist in sorting through the various aspects of the reconstruction process. The problems associated with reconstruction may seem abstract to some readers, but theory meets reality in the form of policies used in past and present efforts to reconstruct conflict-torn, weak and failed states. Bad theory can lead to bad policy, and hence this book.
1-13
To illuminate this last point, consider the growing literature that criticizes the current efforts in Iraq for a lack of foresight, planning and execution. 16 The analysis provided here can assist in understanding not only the current situation in Iraq, but also the limitations of future efforts to construct liberal democracies via military occupation. Applying the economic way of thinking to the topic of reconstruction will yield insights that are of interest not only to academics in a wide range of disciplines but also to policymakers as well.
What Does Reconstruction Entail?
For purposes of clarification, I should specify the terminology and assumptions that serve as the foundation for the analysis that follows. I define reconstruction as the rebuilding of both formal and informal institutions. 17 More specifically, the reconstruction process involves the restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, minimal social services, and structural reform in the political, economic, social and security sectors. 18 The terms "reconstruction," "state building," "nation building," and "peacekeeping" are often used interchangeably. For my purpose, however, these terms capture overlapping but essentially different activities. Reconstruction requires rebuilding, and in some cases building from scratch, both formal and informal institutions in order to achieve fundamental political, economic and social change. State building and nation building can be seen as a subset of reconstruction and involve transferring governance capabilities. Likewise, peacekeeping can be seen as a subset of reconstruction that involves stabilizing a conflict-torn society.
When I use the term "reconstruction," I am referring to the process in its entirety, from the initial occupation through the exit of occupying forces, as well as the wide array of activities that occupiers undertake in the political, economic and social arenas. The reconstruction process 1-14 includes nation building, state building and peacekeeping, but it also goes beyond these activities as well. It is possible for foreign governments to undertake nation building or peacekeeping missions without engaging in a broader reconstruction effort. For example, the operation in Somalia in the mid-1990s started as a humanitarian peacekeeping mission and only later became a broader effort at reconstruction.
Post-conflict reconstruction efforts can be categorized depending on the nature of the conflict that precedes the reconstruction. Categories would include civil wars or humanitarian efforts (i.e., Somalia, Kosovo), the perceived threat of future conflict (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq), or international wars (i.e., Germany and Japan). Within these various categories of conflict, one can further classify the role of the occupying power. At one extreme is long-term colonization and at the other extreme is liberation -and there are a range of possibilities in between.
Part of classifying the role of the occupying power involves clarifying the means used to achieve the desired ends. On the one extreme in this regard is the "brute force" approach, which emphasizes the complete domination of the post-conflict country using whatever force is necessary to impose liberal democratic institutions. At the other extreme is the "light footprint" approach to reconstruction, which places heavy emphasis on the involvement of local indigenous actors coupled with as little international presence as possible. Under the light footprint approach, the role of international forces tends to be limited to peacekeeping-oriented operations, such as maintaining general order and stability. This does not mean that international forces are restrained from intervening in specific affairs as deemed necessary, but rather that such "handson" interventions are viewed as a last resort. The categorical distinctions outlined above will influence the issues involved in the reconstruction process and will be considered throughout the analysis.
1-15
I define ultimate success in the reconstruction process as the achievement of a selfsustaining liberal democratic, economic and social order that does not rely on external monetary or military support. 19 A successful reconstruction does not require fully mature or "consolidated"
institutions, but it does require that the seeds for such institutions be planted. In other words, several years after the exit of occupiers, we should observe movement toward a consolidated liberal democracy.
I take this goal as the given end of reconstruction efforts, meaning that I do not consider if the end goal is itself good or bad. In the context of U.S. politics, the view that sustainable liberal democracy is critical to peace can be traced back to at least Woodrow Wilson, the twentyeighth president of the U.S., who sought to make "the world safe for democracy." 20 humanitarian aid ended, the reconstruction is deemed to have failed to achieve its goal.
Throughout the analysis I will be careful to use the term "liberal democracy." As Fareed
Zakaria has emphasized, "democracy" is often confused with "liberal democracy. The means available to occupiers to achieve the end of sustainable liberal democracy include an array of resources that consist of both physical assets as well as knowledge and information about the specific country and reconstruction in general. The use of these means is constrained by other factors, such as culture and historical experiences in the country being reconstructed and domestic and international public opinion. Along these lines, I will also pay careful attention to the important distinction between controllable and uncontrollable variables.
Controllable variables include those factors that occupying forces can vary as they choose: troop levels, monetary aid, timing of elections, etc. The term uncontrollable variables refers to those factors that cannot be varied at will by occupiers. Examples would include the beliefs and norms of the individuals in the country being reconstructed, or the pressure of domestic and international opinion to follow a certain course of action.
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Although I recognize their critical importance, I will not address the normative issues associated with military intervention and occupation. Instead, I will argue purely as an economist and limit my discussion to empirical questions. My focus on the positive aspect of reconstruction is not intended to downplay the importance of ethical issues. Instead, the normative aspects of the reconstruction issue are beyond the scope of what I address in this inquiry.
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My starting point in this argument is that reconstruction efforts have taken place in the past and are currently underway in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, based on the indications provided by policymakers and the realities of the world, I assume that further attempts at reconstruction will take place in the future. Given the historical reality and the assumption about future efforts, I will focus on understanding what economics can contribute to our understanding of whether military occupation and reconstruction are effective means for achieving the desired ends of spreading liberal democracy to conflict-torn, weak and failed states.
Is Military Occupation the Means to Liberal Democracy? A First Take
The narratives that began this chapter provided some insight into the U.S. experience with occupation and reconstruction. Now that we have established what reconstruction entails, as well as the end goal of reconstruction efforts, it makes sense to take a closer look at the historical record of U.S.-led reconstruction efforts. Doing so will provide some initial insight into the question of whether military occupation is an effective means for generating sustainable liberal democracy.
In order to see if a general pattern exists regarding the success and sustainability of U.S.-led reconstruction efforts, I will utilize the well-known Polity IV Index. 23 The Polity IV Index ranks the political institutions of a country on a 21-point scale of institutionalized democracy. A
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combined "polity score" is then calculated by subtracting the Autocracy (0 to 10) score from the Democracy (0 to 10) score. The resulting scale ranges from +10 (fully democratic) to -10 (fully autocratic). This index is especially useful because data are provided for most countries from the 1800s through 2003.
The categories of democracy and autocracy incorporate several key dimensions.
Institutionalized democracy, as defined by the authors of Polity IV, consists of three key elements: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express their preferences, (2) the presence of institutionalized constraints on the executive, and (3) executive. 25 This same benchmark has been employed in several studies focusing on democratic peace.
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In order to be as charitable as possible, however, I will employ a substantially lower score of +4. To put this score in context, as of 2003, Iran, which President Bush declared to be a member of the "Axis of Evil," was a +3. By employing a +4 score as a benchmark, I am essentially asking, "Were U.S.-led reconstruction efforts able to generate a political regime slightly better than present-day Iran?"
Timing is yet another issue in making a judgment regarding the success of a reconstruction process. If the end goal of reconstruction efforts is to establish a self-sustaining liberal democracy, one must consider the status of these countries well after occupying forces exit the country. In some cases, as in postwar Japan and West Germany, liberal democracy might occur immediately, but in other instances, reconstruction efforts might plant the seeds of liberal democracy that only blossom several years down the line. Likewise, a county might appear to be a liberal democracy when occupiers initially exit the country only to unravel soon thereafter.
What is important in our consideration here, and I would argue, on the largest of scales, is whether reconstructed liberal democratic institutions are sustainable over the long-run.
There is debate among political scientists regarding the timeframe of when a democracy becomes established or "consolidated." The suggested timeframe ranges anywhere from ten to twenty-five years. 27 Recognizing that there is not a consensus on this issue, I will consider the Polity Score for U.S.-led reconstruction efforts in five-year intervals: 5, 10, and 15 years after the exit of occupying troops. In other words, I want to understand if these countries had a political regime that scored at least a +4 in five-year increments after the official and final exit of U.S.
occupiers. The results are summarized in Of those cases in Table 1 that failed to achieve a score of +4, have reconstruction efforts generated any positive change in the country's pre-occupation Polity Score? I assume no benchmark in this consideration but simply ask the question more specifically as follows: "Did the reconstruction effort have any positive impact on the country's pre-occupation Polity Score as measured 5, 10 or 15 years after the end of the occupation?" The results are summarized in Any positive increase in the score is recorded as a "Yes," while any score that stays constant or falls is recorded as a "No." As Table 2 indicates, in four instances did a country where reconstruction failed to achieve a +4 score experience any increase in its Polity Score from the pre-occupation level. In Panama, the pre-occupation score was -3 and increased to -1 fifteen years later, in 1951. Panama's score would fall to a -8 prior to the subsequent U.S. This exercise is meant to provide a first take, a basis for understanding whether military occupation is an effective means for achieving liberal democracy. While there is no clear indication of what a "good" success rate might be, the U.S. has achieved a 28% success rate for reconstructions that ended at least ten year ago and a 39% success rate for those that ended at least fifteen years ago. In short, at the very least, the historical record shows more failures than successes and indicates that democracy cannot be exported in a consistent manner at gunpoint.
Admittedly, there are clear cases of success, but there are more clear cases of failure.
Understanding these drastically different outcomes is the main aim of this book.
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What is to Come
As stated previously, I will seek to analyze the issue of post-conflict reconstruction using the tools of economics, and in order to do so, I will draw on various economic fields, including Austrian Economics, Behavioral Economics, Constitutional Political Economy, New
Institutional Economics and Public Choice Economics. It is my view that each of these theoretical perspectives can offer us important insights that will contribute to answering the question driving this analysis. I do not assume any specialized knowledge of these fields on the part of the reader, but rather, I merely point out the synthesis of perspectives that the following analysis entails. Economics is a broad field of many complementary and contending perspectives, and this fact allows any economic investigator many tools with which to explore the issue at hand.
The methodology employed in this book is what has been called the "analytic narrative,"
which blends the analytical tools of economics and political science with the narrative form of exposition common in historical research. 33 In other words, it combines the framework provided by economics and political science with the emphasis on the context of historical occurrences.
As such, this method provides a means of understanding past events and causal mechanisms that allow for the generation of policy implications for the present and future. For instance, the narrative approach allows for the exploration of strategic interaction and the impact of historical experiences on past and current reconstruction efforts.
This method is especially conducive to analysis of reconstruction, which is a difficult topic to handle formally for a variety of reasons. There are some general databases, such as the aforementioned Polity IV Index, but the number of relevant and interacting variables in the 1-26 reconstruction process is large and the actual variable set contains the histories of many different cultures for which no systematic database exists. As the political scientist Samuel Huntington has noted, there is no single factor, or set of factors, that "causes" democracy across countries and across time. Instead, democratization in different countries is a result of differing causal combinations specific to the country. 34 Given this complexity, the analytic narrative method fits well with an analysis of reconstruction efforts generally in as much as attempts to establish liberal democracy have occurred in different countries at different times. Given these broad parameters, any approach will be relatively informal compared to that employed by my colleagues in most other fields of economics. Nevertheless, I feel that the importance of the topic and the potential contribution of the field of economics to our understanding of the reconstruction process militate in favor of study rather than neglect.
Chapter 2 provides a model to understand the reconstruction process wherein I draw on some basic concepts from game theory in order to understand the reconstruction "game." I postulate that successful reconstructions are those where occupiers are effectively able to transform situations of conflict into situations of coordination around a set of conjectures, beliefs and expectations that support liberal democracy. The following two chapters then consider the mechanisms that contribute to, or prevent, the necessary transformation from conflict to cooperation. Chapter 3 focuses on the mechanisms that facilitate or prevent cooperation among the indigenous citizens of the country being reconstructed. The subsequent chapter considers the mechanisms influencing the behavior of occupiers in their efforts to export liberal democracy.
After exploring the specifics of these mechanisms, I apply them to historical and current reconstruction efforts. I dedicate a chapter to case studies for each of the following categories of reconstruction:
1-27 For instance, the number of troops per thousand inhabitants was significantly higher in Bosnia and Kosovo (20 and 18.6 per 1,000 inhabitants respectively) as compared to Japan (5 per 1,000 inhabitants). Along similar lines, Somalia had either the same number or more troops per thousand inhabitants than Japan over the first two and a half years of occupation and a drastically different outcome.
Likewise, it may appear that initial total monetary aid is an important controllable factor that contributes to ultimate success or failure, and indeed, total aggregate assistance during the first two years of occupation has varied greatly across historical reconstruction efforts, from $12 billion in Germany to approximately $5 billion in Bosnia, $4 billion in Japan, and slightly under $2 billion in Kosovo and Afghanistan. However, when adjusted for per capita assistance, one finds that Bosnia received approximately $1,400 per capita in aid, Kosovo received more than $800 in per capita aid, Germany received approximately $300 per capita, and Japan less than $100 per capita in aid.
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When it comes down to it, policymakers and social scientists know what ultimate success entails. They also have an understanding of the array of factors that influence the reconstruction process. The level of military forces, foreign aid, the timing of elections, culture, historical experience, ethnic tensions, and the many other variables all matter for the ultimate outcome of reconstruction efforts. However, lacking is an understanding of how these controllable variables interact and influence each other as well as the "right" levels required for success on a consistent basis. In short, while the end goal is clear, the knowledge of how to employ various means to achieve this end is lacking. It is critical to keep this distinction in mind between the "know-what"
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-knowing what a successful reconstruction looks like -and the "know-how" -understanding how to bring about the desired end. It is only by recognizing this distinction that we can hope to understand why reconstruction efforts have failed to be consistently successful, and in some cases have caused more harm than good.
Uncontrollable variables serve as a constraint on controllable variables.
A key element of the economic way of thinking is the recognition of constraints. For instance, the amount of goods and services a consumer can purchase is constrained by his income and prices. In the context of reconstruction, key constraints are often neglected. Focus is often placed on the political and military leaders of the occupying forces as the main constraints. One hears criticisms of these individuals for poor planning, too few troops, too little funding, lack of an exit strategy, etc. If only these leaders would adjust their behavior either by shifting strategy or increasing monetary or physical resources, critics contend, the outcomes of reconstruction efforts would be drastically different. But focusing solely on political and military leaders as the key constraints overlooks the contextual constraints within the country being reconstructed.
In his analysis of Central and Eastern Europe, the economist Svetozar Pejovich concluded that the transition from communism to capitalism is not merely a technical issue. 41 In other words, the same expenditure of resources in different transition efforts will yield different outcomes. Similar reasoning applies to the case of reconstruction. Why is this the case? To borrow a phrase from Pejovich, "It's the culture, stupid."
Economists are often uncomfortable with the concept of "culture" because it is difficult to define let alone neatly quantify.
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accepted by social scientists. When I use the term culture in this analysis, I will follow those scholars who define the term as the informal rules that constrain human interaction. 43 From this viewpoint, a society's culture is the existing array of values, customs, traditions, belief systems and other mores passed from one generation to the next. By this definition, culture is an "informal institution," which means that it is not formally mandated but co-exists with formal institutions such as constitutions and written laws.
Acting within these formal and informal institutions are various individual actors and also organizations, which are groups of individuals joined for some common purpose. 44 Culture constrains the actions of individuals and the various organizational forms that individuals can achieve within a given set of formal institutions. In other words, the creation of a wide array of organizations -political groups (parties, councils, senates), economic bodies (families and firms) and social bodies (associations) -will be constrained by the existing endowment of culture. For instance, the economist Timur Kuran has analyzed how certain informal institutions in the Middle East have created "evolutionary bottlenecks" that serve as constraints on certain organizational forms. 45 Indeed, the limitations on certain organizational forms have been a main cause of economic stagnation in the region.
Culture is perhaps the greatest constraint on reconstruction efforts. Francis Fukuyama has argued that democratic consolidation must take place on four levels. Culture is the "deepest" level and therefore is "safely beyond the reach of institutional solutions, and hence of public
1-32
This is due to the fact that these countries have different endowments of culture -capital and knowledge that constrain the effectiveness of those resources.
The reader should note that this is not an argument for long-run cultural determinism.
Indeed, research shows that all states possess some democratic potential. 47 Instead, culture can be seen as a short-term constraint on the process through which liberal democracy is established and evolves. Culture establishes the limits to the indigenous acceptance of policies implemented by occupiers at the time of the reconstruction, and formally reconstructed institutions require the existence of certain complementary institutions and capabilities to operate in the desired manner.
Absent these complementary informal institutions, the same institutions transplanted in different societies will yield drastically different results. When the underlying culture and reconstruction efforts coincide, liberal orders will flourish, and absent this coincidence, the sustainability of reconstructed orders will be a constant struggle. 48 Continued force will be required where voluntary acceptance is absent. Given that the projected end of reconstruction is a self-sustaining liberal democracy, this is not a desirable state of affairs.
Reconstruction efforts suffer from a nirvana fallacy.
The term "nirvana fallacy" was first used by the economist Harold Demsetz to describe the comparison of real markets to ideal government institutions lacking imperfection. 49 Such a comparison leads to the conclusion that government intervention is required to overcome the failures of markets. Flawless government intervention is desirable when compared to imperfect market outcomes.
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Demsetz argued that such comparisons were unrealistic, leading to faulty analyses and conclusions. The reality is that government also suffers from imperfections, and due to these imperfections, government actors may fail to allocate resources as effectively as even an imperfect market. In short, one cannot assume that "the grass is greener on the other side," that government intervention will yield a better outcome as compared to the situation which would exist in the absence of those interventions.
A similar fallacy often applies to reconstruction efforts. In the context of reconstruction, a nirvana fallacy occurs when it is assumed that, in the face of a weak, failed or illiberal government, external occupiers can provide a better outcome relative to what would exist in the absence of those efforts. This is not to say that reconstruction efforts can never have beneficial effects, but neither can it be assumed that occupation will yield beneficial outcomes.
As subsequent chapters will make clear, occupiers face constraints not just within the country being reconstructed but also from their home country as well. For instance, the political decision-making process in the country carrying out the reconstruction will influence the overall effort. As will be discussed, the incentives created by the political system often lead political actors to produce policies that fail to align with the broader goals of the reconstruction effort.
Reconstruction efforts might not merely fail to achieve the desired end -there is also the real possibility that the efforts of foreign occupiers can cause more harm than good. Obviously, such harm is usually an unintended consequence, and as will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, these negative unintended consequences can occur along two key margins.
The first margin consists of unintended consequences that are internal to the country External unintended consequences can also result from reconstruction efforts. In other words, the actions of occupiers may generate "neighborhood effects" which cause harm to those outside the country being occupied. For instance, in a recent study, political scientists Edward
Mansfield and Jack Snyder explore the claim that democracies are less likely to go to war. Their main finding is that, while it is true that consolidated democracies tend not to engage in conflict with one another, immature democracies transitioning from authoritarian regimes do tend to engage in conflict. What some may find more surprising is that the authors of this study find that immature democracies are more likely to engage in conflict and war when compared to authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that individuals vying for political positions in democratizing countries tend to appeal to hard-line nationalism in order to gain support, while separating themselves from both competitors within the country and foreigners as well.
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To understand the implications of external unintended consequences, assume that the U.S. is successful in planting the seeds of democracy in Iraq. In such a case, political, economic and social institutions would be fragile as their full development would be far from complete.
With a semi-democratized Iraq, one could envision an array of political competitors employing nationalism against neighboring countries to obtain positions of leadership and power. While these fragile institutions might provide minimal stability within Iraq, appeals to Iraqi nationalism might very well generate conflict between Iraq and its neighbors along the lines that Mansfield and Snyder outline. In such a situation, the U.S. might achieve the goal of bringing some semblance of stability to Iraq, but only at the cost of increasing the potential for conflict in the larger Middle East region. 50 There are many other examples of external negative unintended consequences as well.
For instance, some have argued that the current war in Iraq will generate a "blowback" whereby current reconstruction efforts will create the future generation of insurgents who will seek targets around the world. 51 As discussed above, in this case, efforts to bring stability to Iraq through reconstruction would generate negative consequences for other countries around the world.
To summarize this lesson to be learned, while the failure of endogenous institutions in countries with weak, failed or illiberal governments may indeed be significant, the failures generated by foreign governments can be even greater. occupation in these countries has produced a backlash that has contributed to increased violence and conflict. To reiterate, while formal rules can be changed quickly, they must be grounded in the informal everyday practices of a society in order to operate as desired. In the absence of complementary informal institutions, formally reconstructed institutions will be dysfunctional.
Where these institutional complements are lacking, formal institutions will be ignored or fail to have the desired impact.
While policymakers and academics have typically focused on reconstruction efforts as a means of generating changes in preferences and opportunities, alternative mechanisms have been neglected. This is a mistake. It is my contention that political, economic and social change that is imposed at the point of a gun is more likely to be met with resistance and is less likely to "stick" once occupiers exit the country. Among the key neglected mechanisms for fostering sustaining change is a commitment to non-intervention coupled with free trade and exchange, not just in physical goods and services, but also in cultural products, ideas, beliefs and institutions. Instead of employing illiberal means (occupation and coercion) to achieve liberal ends, the focus should shift to liberal means (non-intervention and free trade) to achieve liberal ends. As I will discuss, a commitment to non-intervention and free trade has a long tradition in the U.S. and co-opting others to shift their preferences in the desired manner. 52 This stands in contrast to "hard power" which relies on coercion to achieve the desired end. As such, free trade provides the potential to attract others to voluntarily adopt liberal values and institutions.
In addition to the widely recognized economic benefits, free trade produces cultural benefits by increasing the menu of choices available to all. 53 As Tyler Cowen, an economist, indicates, cross-cultural exchange allows different cultures to simultaneously maintain certain aspects of their unique identities while merging with others and becoming similar on other margins. As such, free trade can be seen as a means of finding a common ground between cultures both within and across borders. A commitment to trade, coupled with non-intervention, provides the opportunity to exchange cultural practices and ideas and the potential for enemies to be transformed into trading partners. Along similar lines, free exchange allows for the imitation of both formal and informal institutions, as well as organizational structures within these institutions, across national borders resulting in social change through peaceful interaction.
Because of the potential for these positive outcomes, non-intervention and free trade deserve at least a fair hearing as a viable alternative to spreading liberal democracy via military occupation.
Given the less than stellar record of the U.S. in spreading liberal democracy at gunpoint, such alternatives must be seriously considered. 
The emergence of democracy in a country is the result of a combination of causes, (4) The causes responsible for the emergence of democracy are not the same as those promoting its consolidation, (5) The combination of causes promoting democratic transition and consolidation varies from country to country and (6) The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs from those responsible for other waves.
